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A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ECOLOGICAL INTERFACE DESIGN 
Kim J. Vicente and Jens Rasmussen 
Risø National Laboratory 
Roskilde, Denmark 
ABSTRACT. A theoretical framework for designing interfaces for complex 
systems is described. The framework, called ecological interface design (EID), 
suggests a set of principles for designing interfaces in a way that supports 
the fundamental properties of human cognition. The basis of EID is the 
skills, rules, knowledge model of cognitive control. In order to support the 
full range of operator problem solving activities, EID suggests how to design 
interfaces that simultaneously support each of the three levels of cognitive 
control, but that do not force processing to a higher level than the demands 
of the task require. The EID approach extends the concept of direct manipu-
lation interfaces by taking into account the added complications introduced 
by complex systems. In this paper, we describe the development of the 
framework, its theoretical foundations, and examples of its application to 
various work domains.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, a new form of human-computer interaction called Direct Manipu-
lation Interfaces (DMI) has emerged. While reports about DMI have been 
very enthusiastic (Shneiderman, 1983), very little is known about how to de-
sign such interfaces, or about why they are so effective (Hutchins, Hollan, 
and Norman, 1986). In this paper, we are concerned with extending the ben-
efits of DMI to the area of complex systems. With this aim in mind, we begin 
by reviewing two existing theories of DMI, and by pointing out their limita-
tions with respect to complex systems.  
2. THEORIES OF DIRECT MANIPULATION INTERFACES 
In this section, we will describe two existing theories of DMI. The first of 
these is the Syntactic-Semantic Model (SSM) of Shneiderman (1983), and 
the second is the description based on the Gulfs of Evaluation and Execu-
tion provided by Hutchins et al. (1986). 
2.1. The Syntactic-Semantic Model 
Shneiderman (1983) begins with the distinction between syntax and seman-
tics. He states that syntax is an arbitrary convention, and therefore may be 
difficult to learn and remember. In contrast, semantic knowledge represents 
the user's understanding of the domain. Usually, semantic knowledge is hi-
erarchically organized with general knowledge being decomposed into more 
specific concepts. Because it is meaningful, semantic knowledge is viewed as 
being system independent and relatively stable in long-term memory. Given 
this distinction, Shneiderman states that, when interacting with computers, 
users decompose higher level semantic concepts into lower level concepts 
that come closer to the syntax domain (see Figure 2a). According to this ac-
count, the advantage of DMI is that they display the objects of interest to the 
user, so that actions are directly in the high-level problem domain. As a con-
sequence, the degree of decomposition required before selecting a command 
is reduced. 
It is clear that the tight coupling between semantics and syntax is one of 
the keys to DMI. However, upon close examination, Shneiderman's account 
of the benefits of DMI is somewhat vague. Of course, this is to be expected 
since his paper was written at a time when the concepts of DMI were quite 
novel. We now recognize that there are several limitations to Shneiderman's 
SSM. First, the term semantics is used loosely to include the user's goals, 
his knowledge about how to carry out those goals (independent of syntax), 
and his domain knowledge. It is important to distinguish between these for 
they are not the same. 
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A second limitation of the model is that it only describes the process of 
forming a command (the output side of the interaction process). An equally 
important aspect of DMI is the processes involved in the input side, i.e., in 
the perception and interpretation of the displayed information. This aspect is 
relatively ignored, the only mention being that the objects that are displayed 
represent high-level semantic concepts. 
Finally, the most complicated issue is exactly how the semantics should 
map onto the syntax. This problem is not dealt with in the model. If we ac-
cept the explanation that DMI reduce the decomposition process by making 
available actions that correspond to high-level domain concepts, several im-
portant questions arise. What is the appropriate 'high-level' at which the 
semantic concepts map onto commands? If the user has goals at multiple 
levels, should there be a command for each goal or only at some 'baseline' 
semantic level? The framework provided by the model is not robust enough 
to allow us to address these questions. 
2.2. The Gulfs of Evaluation and Execution 
Hutchins et al. (1986) also provide a theory of DMI. They begin their discus-
sion with the premise that the general problem in human-computer interac-
tion is that "the person's goals are expressed in terms relevant to the person 
- in psychological terms and the system's mechanisms and states are ex-
pressed in terms relative to it - in physical terms" (Norman, 1986, p. 38). As 
shown in Figure 1, the mismatch can be characterized by two gulfs between 
person and machine. The figure is actually a simplified version of Ras-
mussen's (1974; 1986) decision ladder. The Gulf of Execution refers to the 
gap between the person's goals and intentions, and the inputs that the com-
puter recognizes. The Gulf of Evaluation, on the other hand, refers to the 
gap between the computer's output and the person's conceptual model of 
the task. Either of these gulfs can be bridged by the computer or by the per-
son. Of course, placing the majority of the burden of bridging the gulfs on 
the person greatly increases the cognitive demands of the task, or the dis-
tance introduced by the interface (Hutchins et al., 1986). Each of the gulfs 
has two types of distance associated with it. Semantic distance refers to the 
disparity between the user's intentions and the meaning in the interface 
language, while articulatory distance refers to the distance between the 
physical form of the interface language and its meaning (Hutchins et al., 
1986). 
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Figure 1. The gulfs of execution an evaluation. Adapted from Norman (1986). 
We will first discuss the concept of semantic distance. On the execution 
side, semantic distance of the interface is reduced if the user's intentions 
can be expressed in the command language in a concise manner. The goal 
should be to match the level of description required by the interface lan-
guage to the level at which the person thinks of the task. On the evaluation 
side, semantic distance is reduced if the displayed objects represent the 
higher level concepts that people naturally adopt when reasoning in the 
problem domain. In this case, the goal should be to provide a powerful, pro-
ductive way of thinking about the domain. 
The articulatory distance introduced by an interface is also an important 
factor. On the execution side, the articulatory distance is related to how 
closely the form of the action is to the meaning of the action. For instance, 
articulatory distance is reduced if the user can drag a mouse to move an ob-
ject on the screen, rather than enter a command on the keyboard. On the 
evaluation side, articulatory distance refers to how closely the form of the 
displayed objects resembles their meaning. As an example, effective use of 
icons allows users to infer the meaning of an object from its visual appear-
ance. 
Hutchins et al. (1986) go on to say that the success of DMI is related to 
the feeling of direct engagement that they produce in the user. Thus, the 
person feels as if she is interacting with the concepts of the domain rather 
than with an electronic intermediary. The shorter the semantic and articula-
tory distances, the greater the feeling of direct engagement. Therefore, the 
difference between DMI and conventional interfaces is that the gulfs are 
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bridged by the computer, leaving the person to concentrate on the task at 
hand rather than the interaction process per se. 
A. Syntactic-Semantic Model
(Shne iderman, 1983)
HIGH-LEVEL SEMANTICS
MIDDLE LEVEL SEMANTICS
LOW LEVEL SEMANTICS
COMMAND SYNTAX  
B. Gulf of Execution
(Hutchins et al., 1986)
GOAL
INTENTION
VALID COMMAND
FORM OF COMMAND
SEMANTIC
DISTANCE
ARTICULATORY
DISTANCE
 
Figure 2. Process description of command formulation. 
2.3. A Comparison of the Models 
Obviously, the theory of Hutchins et al. (1986) is more elaborate than 
Shneiderman's (1983). Several of the limitations of the SSM that were identi-
fied above have been overcome. Firstly, the important distinction between 
perception (Gulf of Evaluation) and action (Gulf of Execution) is made. 
Whereas Shneiderman dealt almost exclusively with the formulation of 
commands, i.e., the semantic distance associated with the Gulf of Execu-
tion, Hutchins et al. provide a fuller account of the interaction process. A 
further improvement is the distinction between goals, intentions for accom-
plishing goals, and the evaluation of goals. Figure 2 shows the resulting con-
trast between the two theories in terms of their process descriptions for 
command formulation. Finally, the distinction is also made between the 
mapping between an intention and the meaning of an expression, and that 
between the meaning of an expression and its form. The end result is that 
the theory based on the Gulfs of Execution and Evaluation has greater psy-
chologically validity than the SSM. However, as we shall see, even this ac-
count has its limits. 
2.4. Limitations of Existing Theories With Respect to Process Control 
One of the problems with the SSM is that it does not specify how the seman-
tics should map onto the syntax. Hutchins et al. (1986) state that the main 
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point to consider is the tradeoff between designing a command language 
that has generality and one that provides commands that are at a high level, 
closer to the way people think about the task. In the realm of process con-
trol, this is not a problem for interfaces are designed with very specific appli-
cations in mind; generality is not an important consideration. However, 
there are other properties of process environments that complicate matters 
considerably. 
We will begin with the issues associated with the Gulf of Execution. Ideal-
ly, the mapping would map each intention onto a single unique action; this 
is the isomorphic mapping case. The only problem would then be to choose 
an appropriate level of abstraction, according to the tradeoff described 
above. However, an isomorphic mapping between intentions and actions is 
not feasible in process control because operators have a hierarchy of goals. 
Thus, the question arises whether there should be a command for each goal, 
regardless of its level in the hierarchy, or whether all the commands should 
be at some 'baseline' level. Also, there may be a one-to-many mapping be-
tween intentions and actions as a natural consequence of the complexity in-
herent in the problem domain (eg., coupling between subsystems). This is 
the well known problem of dealing with degrees of freedom. These complexi-
ties introduced by process control systems are beyond the explanatory ca-
pability of the model of Hutchins et al. 
There are additional problems when we consider the Gulf of Evaluation. 
Figure 3 shows the different phases in the gulf. As with the Gulf of Execu-
tion discussed above, there are two segments: semantic and articulatory. 
Semantic distance is reduced by providing users with a powerful and veridi-
cal way of thinking about the problem domain. The display should be a rep-
resentation of the domain. Hutchins et al. (1986) make the important point 
that multiple representations of the same objects are required to suit differ-
ent goals, but they do not pursue the point to any great extent. But multiple 
representations are essential in process control, since as discussed previ-
ously, operators reason about the process at multiple levels. This would 
suggest that different representations may be required to support problem 
solving at different levels of abstraction. 
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Figure 3. The different phases of the gulf of evaluation. Adapted from Norman (1986). 
But even if we are dealing with a single representation, a given stimulus may 
be interpreted in different ways, depending upon the context, the operator's 
current goals, and his level of competence. Thus, the same display can be 
perceived as a pattern of signals for control of direct sensori-motor manipu-
lations, as signs which may act as cues for release of heuristics, or as sym-
bols for use in functional inference. These three semiotic categories provide 
the information necessary for control at the skill-, rule-, and knowledge-
based levels, respectively (Rasmussen, 1983). During task performance, op-
erators will process information at all three levels. But because each of the 
three levels of cognitive control generally supports different types of activities 
(this will be discussed in more detail in a later section), different information 
requirements are necessary. To be effective, an interface must be designed to 
support skill-, rule-, and knowledge-based processing. As mentioned above, 
the framework set out by Hutchins et al. (1986) does not take into account 
the concept of multiple levels of cognitive control. 
In discussing the articulatory distance associated with the Gulf of Evalua-
tion, Hutchins et al. (1986) limit themselves to the topic of icons. The ques-
tion of form, however, is much more involved than merely dealing with the 
problem of getting the user to infer the intended meaning of an object from 
its form. Because we are mainly interested in communication via visual dis-
plays, we will discuss some additional considerations pertaining to the visu-
al form of the displayed information. 
Often, operators are required to make quantitative readings from a display 
in order to determine the state of a certain parameter. Thus, it is important 
to know what form the displayed information should take so that it is easy 
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for the operator to accurately perceive the data. When multiple representa-
tions of the domain are implemented, the visual momentum supported by 
the system becomes an important consideration (Woods, 1985). The problem 
is to develop information presentation techniques that will reduce the men-
tal effort required of users to integrate information across successive dis-
plays. Finally, the problem of perceived structure is also relevant. Any dis-
play has an inherent perceptual structure imposed on it by the human visu-
al processing system. Thus, it would be useful to design the display in such 
a way that the perceived structure matches the organization inherent in the 
problem domain. 
2.5. Summary 
To summarize, existing theories of DMI have certain limitations with respect 
to process control. The fact that people can have a hierarchy of goals, and 
therefore reason at various levels of abstraction, is not accounted for in ei-
ther of the theories reviewed above. The concept of multiple levels of cogni-
tive control is a further complication. In addition, the issues associated with 
visual form have not been thoroughly addressed. What is needed is a a theo-
ry that takes into account these complications so that the benefits of DMI 
can be transferred to process control. The remainder of this paper is con-
cerned with the development of such a theoretical framework. 
3. A MODEL OF HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING 
Our approach will be to develop a framework for interface design that sup-
ports the basic properties of the human cognitive system. By basing design 
decisions on knowledge about human behavior at the process level, rather 
than the performance level, the recommendations that are obtained should 
generalize across different applications (Pew and Baron, 1983). Thus, the 
first step is to describe what we know about human cognition. 
We have adopted Rasmussen's (1974; 1986) model of human information 
processing (HIP) for this purpose. There is an important reason for choosing 
this particular model rather than any of the other existing models of HIP. 
Rasmussen's model was developed by observing operators' problem solving 
activities in actual work situations, and by analyzing human error reports 
from industrial accidents. Since we are interested in designing interfaces for 
complex systems, it is important that the model we select be grounded in the 
type of real-world situations that we are attempting to design for. 
Only a brief overview of the model will be provided here. A more in depth 
description can be found in Rasmussen (1974; 1986). The model consists of 
two different subsystems (see Figure 4): a conscious processor and a sub-
conscious processor, corresponding with attentional and automatic control 
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modes, respectively. Such a dual architecture is common to most well ac-
cepted models of human performance (Reason, 1988). 
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3.1. The Conscious Processor 
The two processors have very different properties. The conscious processor 
is slow, sequential, effortful, and limited by the capacity of short-term 
memory. However, its strength lies in its ability to operate on symbolic in-
formation using its large repertoire of data-processing models and strategies. 
Such an architecture provides the flexibility that is required to cope with 
novel situations. The conscious processor is responsible for what is com-
monly referred to as rational or analytical thinking, i.e., activities such as 
improvisation, decison making, and symbolic reasoning. In addition, it func-
tions as a high-level coordinator of the subconscious subsystem, which is 
the main data processor. 
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3.2. The Subconscious Processor 
The subconscious processor is fast, parallel, effortless, and has a very high 
capacity for processing data. Basically, this subsystem is responsible for the 
functions of perception, motor control, and intuitive judgement. Information 
is decoded from the sensory input, and higher-level features are extracted 
from these data. The patterns extracted from the input data are then used to 
control the actions of the motor system. The coordination between sensory 
input, motor actions, and the dynamic environment is accomplished by a 
dynamic world model, which operates in real time. An essential aspect of 
this model is that it portrays the person as an adaptive, goal-oriented being. 
Thus, the dynamic world model enables people to attend to the invariant 
features of the environment that are essential to the actual goal in the pre-
sent context (the role of perception), and to dynamically generate feedfor-
ward patterns of control actions (the role of motor control). In order to carry 
out this sensorimotor function, the subconscious processor deals with data 
in terms of time-space signals. The major limitation of this subsystem is that 
it is only capable of dealing with familiar, frequently encountered situations. 
When novel events are encountered, there is a mismatch between the behav-
ior of the environment and the expectations provided by the dynamic world 
model. These conditions force processing to the conscious, symbolic level.  
3.3. A Comparison of the Two Subsystems 
The distinction between the conscious and subconscious subsystems of 
human cognition described by Rasmussen (1974) has been independently 
described in the literature under a variety of labels: smart vs. rote instru-
ments (Runeson, 1977); structure oriented vs. state oriented response 
(Rouse, 1983); abstract reasoning vs. concrete activity (Chapman and Agre, 
1986); analytical vs. intuitive cognition (Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and 
Pearson, 1987); discrete symbolic mode vs. continuous dynamic mode 
(Carello, Turvey, Kugler, and Shaw, 1984); and recognitional vs. analytical 
decision making (Klein, in press). While differing in the particular details, all 
of these dichotomies are generally similar to the distinction described in 
Rasmussen's model. In this section, we are interested in identifying the rela-
tive merits of these two processing modes. 
In effect, there is a tradeoff between subconscious and conscious pro-
cessing. The subconscious processor provides a very efficient means of pro-
cessing information, given that we are familiar with the characteristics of the 
environment, as represented in the dynamic world model. This type of pro-
cessing is not possible for novel situations since the requisite model of the 
environment will not be available. The conscious processor, on the other 
hand, allows us to cope with new and unexpected situations but in a com-
paratively laborious fashion. The cost of being able to reason at an abstract 
level is that processing is slow and effortful. Thus, the two subsystems are 
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complementary: neither one has a global superiority over the other, and 
both are necessary to cope with the entire range of demands that the person 
is likely to encounter. Together, they constitute a cognitive architecture that 
can tradeoff processing efficiency for the ability to deal with unanticipated 
variability. 
 
Figure 5. The cave man. Drawing by Bo Bojesen. Reproduced by permission. 
The relative merits of these two processing modes is illustrated in Figure 5. 
A caveman is faced with the task of catching fish with a spear, and he has 
two different ways to go about it. If he were to rely on the analytical ap-
proach based on trigonometry, as shown in the diagram in the bubble, his 
chances of catching a fish would be negligible. The dynamic demands of the 
situation far exceed the processing capabilities of the conscious processor. 
However, with sufficient practice, the caveman will be able to acquire the 
skill of catching the fish by perceiving and acting, rather than thinking. His 
experience will allow him to develop a dynamic world model of the relevant 
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factors: the optical physics, motor control of the spear, and movement of the 
fish. Once such a model is developed, the caveman will be able to effectively 
catch fish by relying on the efficiency of the subconscious processor. Clearly, 
this is a much more appropriate way of dealing with the demands of the sit-
uation. 
However, as mentioned above, there are some disadvantages to the sub-
conscious mode. One important point is that of experience. The caveman will 
have to have a considerable amount of practice with the task before he de-
velops the necessary skills that will allow him to effectively rely on subcon-
scious processing. Secondly, if for some reason, the demands of the situa-
tion change in a substantial way, the skills that the caveman has developed 
will no longer be appropriate. As an example, consider what would happen if 
the refraction index of water were to change significantly. The caveman's dy-
namic world model would no longer be appropriate and he would not be able 
to catch any fish. This is where the advantage of conscious processing 
comes in. Using the analytical approach based on trigonometry, a change in 
the refraction index would be easily accommodated merely by substituting a 
different value for that parameter in the equation.  
3.4. Implications for Interface Design 
What implications does this dual architecture model of HIP have for inter-
face design? There are two characteristics of complex system domains (e.g., 
process control) which allow us to extract some interesting design implica-
tions from the cognitive model described above. First of all, the operators of 
such systems are highly skilled and have extensive experience in controlling 
the system. Secondly, interface design for complex systems consists of speci-
fying an interface for a single, specific application; generality is not im-
portant. Thus, unlike word processors which will be used for a variety of ap-
plications, complex systems are designed with fixed and well defined pur-
poses in mind. In this way, the problem domain can be thought of as a 
closed world. 
These two factors, skilled operator and bounded problem solving world, 
make subconscious processing an attractive possibility. The fact that opera-
tors will have extensive experience with the system means that they will 
have the opportunity to develop a dynamic world model that will allow them 
to effectively rely on subconscious processing. Also, the fact that the opera-
tors will be dealing with the same system means that, if a way can be found 
to describe the problem solving world, then the need for dealing with novel 
situations should be minimal. This, in turn, implies that the reliance on 
conscious processing should also be minimized. Together, these two charac-
teristics of complex systems suggest that the design should be aimed at tak-
ing advantage of the processing efficiency of the subconscious processor. 
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The characteristics of the subconscious processor have evolved from prim-
itive man's necessity to dynamically interact with his environment in order 
to survive. These demands have resulted in the development of a subsystem 
that is characterized by very efficient feature extraction and classification, 
and dynamic coordination of the motor system with the environment. These 
are the skills that people find the most natural, and consequently, they pe-
form them subconsciously, effortlessly, and in parallel. This is not to say 
that subconscious processing is perfect. Even in cases where people have 
developed the necessary skills, subconscious processing is still susceptible 
to errors, especially failures of attention (Reason, 1984). However, under cer-
tain conditions, the efficiency of subconscious far exceeds that of conscious 
processing. The claim that subconscious processing can be carried out more 
effectively and with less effort than conscious processing is a well founded 
one; it has both theoretical (Rasmussen, 1986; Reason, 1987; 1988) and 
empirical support (Hammond et al., 1987). An obvious goal for interface de-
sign would be to take advantage of this strength (cf. Brehmer, 1986). 
It is important to realize that we are not claiming that, in situations where 
skilled people are interacting with a closed and fixed problem solving world, 
subconscious processing is always superior to conscious processing. As we 
will discuss below, this is certainly not the case. What we are claiming is 
that these conditions are propicious for subconscious processing and that 
the designer should take this into account in specifying the interface for the 
system. Given the proper interface, it should be possible for an experienced 
operator to effectively meet most of the task demands by relying on subcon-
scious processing. The hypothesis behind this claim is that the level of per-
formance of the man-machine system will be enhanced if the interface is de-
signed in a way that will allow the operator to take advantage of the efficien-
cy of subconscious processing. 
We will close this section with a final comment on the nature of the rec-
ommendation we are making. Again, figure 5 will serve as a useful example. 
In designing interfaces, we cannot change the properties of the domain nor 
the properties of the person. Both of these are fixed. For instance, in figure 
5, the caveman must take into account the physical principles illustrated in 
the diagram inside the bubble. These physical principles represent the de-
mands of the task, and if the fish is to be caught then they must be taken 
into account. This cannot be avoided. The degrees of freedom in design are 
in how to deal with these demands. The argument developed above can be 
viewed as an attempt at answering the question: What is the most efficient 
and most effective processing mechanism that people can use to cope with 
the demands of the domain? Answering this question allows us to formulate 
recommendations for designing interfaces that attempt to take advantage of 
the people's most powerful capabilities. 
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4. THE PROPENSITY FOR SUBCONSCIOUS PROCESSING 
The discussion so far suggests that it would be highly adaptive to take ad-
vantage of the efficiency of subconscious processing. Interestingly enough, 
people naturally adopt such a strategy. There is ample evidence from psy-
chological research to show that people strongly favor the utilization of the 
effortless, parallel, routines available to subconscious processing (Hollnagel, 
1981; Klein, in press; Rasmussen, 1974; Reason, 1987; Rouse, 1983). Peo-
ple attempt to simplify complex tasks by taking advantage of their most 
powerful cognitive resource. 
4.1. An Example 
The work of Klein (in press) provides an excellent example of people's pro-
pensity for subconscious processing. He conducted a series of naturalistic 
studies of expert decision making in several domains: firefighting, military 
operations, and engineering design. The data were collected by, first, identi-
fying non-routine events requiring skilled decision making, and second, 
conducting interviews to probe these events in order to examine the nature 
of the decison making process. Over a hundred cases were analyzed in total. 
Since the incidents examined were non-routine, we would expect that de-
cision making would be, to use Klein's terms, analytical rather than recogni-
tional, i.e., based on conscious processing rather than subconscious pro-
cessing. Surprisingly, the results indicated that, even in such critical inci-
dents, experts relied mainly on the recognitional mode of decision making. 
Such a strategy is adaptive in several respects. In terms of mental effort, the 
recognitional mode is less taxing than the analytical mode. In terms of effec-
tiveness, recognitional decision making allows experts to take advantage of 
their experience. Because of his wealth of experience, the expert is able to 
decide on an appropriate action to take rather than consciously generating 
and evaluating a set of alternatives. Finally, in terms of appropriateness, 
recognitional decision making is much quicker than analytical decision 
making, and therefore allows experts to effectively cope with time stress. 
These results support the argument outlined in the previous section. If we 
can design interfaces that allow people to effectively take advantage of sub-
conscious processing, then the benefits can be great. However, there is a 
major difference between the domains that Klein investigated and those with 
which we are concerned: in complex, high technology systems, the system 
being controlled is not directly observable. While Klein's results illustrate the 
potential benefits of subconscious processing, they do not give us any indi-
cation as to how to derive these benefits through proper interface design, 
nor do they tell us what can go wrong if the proper support for subconscious 
processing is not provided. 
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4.2. What Can Go Wrong 
The problem with existing interfaces is that, rather than supporting this 
preference for subconscious processing, they penalize people for it instead. 
An experimental study conducted by Hollnagel (1981) in the area of process 
control provides an excellent example of this point. 
The fact that the process being controlled is not directly observable leads 
to two phenomenologically different types of control strategies that can be 
adopted by operators. Following Hollnagel (1981), we will refer to these as 
surface control (corresponding to subconscious processing) and deep control 
of the system (corresponding to conscious processing). Surface control is 
guided by the plant as it is represented by the displays. In contrast, deep 
control of the system is guided by one's knowledge of the underlying pro-
cess. While this surface control/deep control distinction is best thought of 
as a continuum, and not as two discrete control strategies, experience with 
investigations of process environments has often indicated that operators 
have a distinct preference for surface control rather than deep control of the 
system (Rasmussen, 1974; Rouse, 1983). This is how the omnipresent char-
acteristic of human cognition to prefer subconscious to conscious processing 
manifests itself in process control. 
Hollnagel's (1981) experiment provides a typical example of this pattern of 
behavior. Subjects tended to disregard the properties of the physical process 
which was controlled, and relied on the perceptual characteristics of the 
display instead. In effect, they often treated the system as if it was physically 
structured as the display indicated. However, as is the case with most exist-
ing systems, the displays were not designed to be veridical representations 
of the process. Thus, the strategy of surface control results in several classes 
of problems. First, it is easy for operators to forget, and therefore fail to con-
sider, properties of the process which were not shown in the displayed rep-
resentation of the system. Secondly, because of the inconsistent mapping 
between the abstract properties of the process and the cues or signs provid-
ed by the display, the cues that operators normally rely on to control the 
system are imperfectly correlated with the state of the system. Thus, in novel 
situations, surface control will result in underspecification and human error 
(Rasmussen and Vicente, 1987). 
It is evident that present systems are not designed to support the basic 
characteristics of human cognition, as outlined above. This results from the 
fact that most current displays present the operator with elemental, physical 
data that are measured by sensors. Thus, in order to adopt a deep control 
strategy, the operator must perform what we call a translation task, i.e., he 
must map the elemental data that are displayed onto the abstract, higher-
level properties of the process. Because this mapping is usually quite com-
plex, the translation task requires considerable effort. In a similar vein, it is 
 21 
difficult for operators to map their intentions onto a sequence of actions that 
the system will accept. The important point to realize is that, due to the way 
systems are currently designed, deep control requires the operator to per-
form the translation task unaided. In keeping with the preference for sub-
conscious processing, operators will often adopt a surface control strategy 
rather than take the effort to perform the translation task necessary for deep 
control. 
4.3. Implications for Interface Design 
In the previous section, we suggested that interfaces should be designed in 
such a way as to allow people to effectively rely on subconscious processing 
since it is more effective and less effortful than conscious processing. In this 
section, we have identified another reason for supporting subconscious pro-
cessing: not only is it a more effective way of dealing with the demands of 
the task, but it is also the strategy that people naturally adopt. The work of 
Klein (in press) shows how prevalent this strategy is, as well as the benefits 
that can result from it. The work of Hollnagel (1981) illustrates the types of 
problems that are encountered if the interface does not support this strate-
gy. 
It is worthwhile mentioning that the idea of supporting operators' natural 
tendency to take advantage of the processing efficiency of the subconscious 
processor is not a novel suggestion, as the following quote from Rasmussen 
(1974, p. 11) indicates:  
"the process operator lives in a complex world. The information presented to him is 
a code for the physical, dynamical process in the interior of the plant. He is able to 
...operate on the physical meaning of the symbols by rational deductive reasoning. 
During frequent routine tasks, however, he may be operating the control desk - not 
the process - by his subconscious routines. He may be able to improvise rapidly and 
subconsciously ... if he is allowed to break down subconsciously the information pat-
terns into familiar generic units. This is only possible if he can control the process di-
rectly - the display system therefore should be 'transparent' and the physical process 
should be directly 'touchable' on the control desk." 
The similarity between these ideas and the basic concepts behind DMI is 
striking. 
We are now in a position to reformulate the claims for DMI in terms of the 
general properties of human cognition. The success of DMI can be attributed 
to the fact that they allow people to take advantage of the efficiency of sub-
conscious processing. This is a theoretically satisfying explanation of DMI 
but it does not give us any indication as to how to go about building such 
interfaces. This is a result of the fact that the description of human cogni-
tion that we have used up to this point, while useful, is overly simplified. In 
order to develop a more complete understanding of the cognitive processes 
relevant to interface design, we require a more comprehensive framework. 
Therefore, in the nect section we will leave behind the conscious vs. subcon-
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scious distinction, and will instead adopt Rasmussen's (1983; 1986) skills, 
rules, knowledge (SRK) framework.  
5. MULTIPLE LEVELS OF COGNITIVE CONTROL 
5.1. The SRK Framework 
The basic tenet of the SRK framework is that information can be interpreted 
in three distinct ways: as signals, signs, and symbols. The way in which in-
formation is interpreted determines which of the three types of cognitive 
control is activated: skill-based behavior (SBB), rule-based behavior (RBB), 
and knowledge-based behavior (KBB), respectively. Thus, control may de-
pend on a repertoire of automated behavioral patterns (SBB), a set of state-
action production rules (RBB), or problem solving operations in a symbolic 
representation (KBB).  
In terms of the model of HIP outlined earlier, SBB and RBB are within the 
realm of subconscious processing whereas KBB is the responsibility of the 
conscious processor. We can reformulate the points made in the previous 
sections in terms of the SRK framework. First, lower levels of cognitive con-
trol tend to be carried out more effectively and with less effort than higher 
levels. Second, people have a definite preference for relying on lower levels of 
cognitive control. The basic implication that we derived is that interfaces 
should be designed to allow people to meet the demands of the task by rely-
ing on lower levels of cognitive control. 
How does one go about doing this? In very general terms, we know that 
the form of the information must meet certain requirements for each level. 
SBB can only be activated when information is presented in the form of 
time-space signals. RBB, on the other hand, is triggered by familiar percep-
tual structures. And finally, KBB is activated by meaningful relational struc-
tures. 
However, the form in which information is presented does not directly de-
termine which level of cognitive control will be activated. Several other fac-
tors are also important. First, all other things being equal, more demanding 
tasks will tend to require higher levels of cognitive control (cf. Rasmussen, 
1983; Sanderson and Harwood, 1988). Second, all other things being equal, 
the degree to which an actor can effectively rely on lower levels of cognitive 
control is also a function of his skill and experience. More experienced ac-
tors are able to deal with most task demands by relying on lower levels of 
cognitive control (cf. Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986; Klein, in press; Rasmus-
sen, 1983; Sanderson and Harwood, 1988). In summary, the demands of the 
task, the actor's experience, and the form in which information is presented 
combine to determine which level of cognitive control is activated. 
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This means that even if we follow the recommendation made earlier of de-
signing interfaces that allow people to rely on lower levels of cognitive con-
trol, they may nevertheless have to resort to higher levels of cognitive con-
trol. Therefore, merely supporting the lower levels is not sufficient. To be tru-
ly effective, an interface should also support higher levels of cognitive con-
trol. In order to determine what the information requirements for each of the 
levels are, it is necessary to understand how each of the different levels are 
related, and what the activities associated with each level are. 
5.2. Interaction Between Levels 
While it is possible to describe each of the levels independently, task perfor-
mance will usually require a simultaneous consideration of all three levels of 
cognitive control (see Figure 6). For instance, during execution of skill-based 
routines (shown as synchronous activities in Figure 6), conscious attention 
is free to, and usually does, cope with other matters on a time sharing basis. 
As an example, if the next task requires a sequence of activities which will 
not integrate into an automated pattern, the rule-based domain will be in-
volved in retrieving a relevant rule-set from memory as the skilled move-
ments are being performed. Also, during task performance interrupts may 
occur when choices are to be made or when adjustments of the current in-
ternal model are needed. These rule-based behaviors are shown in Figure 6 
as synchronic activities. 
Planni ng in Terms   
of  Functional Reas on- 
ing by Means of  Sym- 
bolic Model:  
     "As C an Be".   
        Achro nic
Planni ng in Terms  of   
Recall  of  Past and  
Rehea rsal of  Future, 
Predicted Scenario s: 
     "As Has Been  
       and May Be"   
       Diachronic
Attent ion on Cue 
Classi f ication 
and Choice of   
Action Alternatives  
 
       Synchronic
  KNOLEDGE-BA SED 
  DOMAIN
 RULE-BASED 
 DOMA IN
SKILL-BASED 
DOMA IN
 "As Is"
Datadriven Chaini ng of  Sub-Ro utines with I nterrupt to 
Conscious, Rule-ba sed Choice i n Case of  A mbiguity or 
Deviat ion from Current State o f  the Interna l World Model.
 Synchronuos
 OFF-LINE EVALUATION 
        AND PLANNING
 ON-L INE, REAL   
TIME  OPERATION
  
"As Is " 
 
Figure 6. Interaction between the different levels of cognitive control.  
When skilled activities are running smoothly, attention can also be diverted 
to the evaluation of past and planning of future activities. This may require 
knowledge-based analysis and planning, or recall and evaluation of the suc-
cess of previous application of rules. These are shown in Figure 6 as achron-
ic and diachronic activities, respectively. Important activities include fore-
cast of future needs, recall and internal rehearsal of relevant rules, and ar-
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rangement of rules in proper order in memory for later activation. For the 
present purposes, the most important implication of this dynamic interac-
tion between the different levels of cognitive control is that the information 
required for on-line control of the current activity, and off-line planning con-
siderations may not belong to the same time frame, nor to the same part of 
the problem space. 
It is evident then that the structure of the internal control of cognitive ac-
tivities has important implications for interface design. The information pre-
sented to the operator will have at least three distinct functions in the con-
trol of a complex work sequence. Information must be available for activa-
tion of skilled routines; for control of the course of the routines and, finally, 
for monitoring of proper result of an activity. Each of these will be discussed 
in greater detail below. To anticipate, the important point is that it is essen-
tial that an interface be able to support control of performance at different 
cognitive levels, not only because users with different levels of training may 
use the same system, but also because activation, control, and monitoring 
will require different interactions between cognitive levels. 
5.3. Activation of Task Routines 
Routines will typically be activated by stereotypical signs that are empirically 
correlated with a call for the various task routines. Signs are selected from 
the available information to be clearly salient features which are convenient 
and sufficient for discrimination between the usually relevant alternatives 
for action. It is a common experience that such signs very often are informal 
information, such as noises from machinery and the sign-action mapping 
will typically only be valid under 'usual work conditions' leading system us-
ers into traps during less familiar situations. An advantage offered by ad-
vanced information technology is that signs that are useful for activating 
sub-routines can be designed as patterns with a more reliable mapping onto 
task requirements. 
5.4. Control of Activities 
Proper control of movements during skill-based routines depends on proper 
alignment and synchronization of the dynamic world model, a function re-
quiring perceptual information patterns serving to maintain the quantitative 
time-space signal transmission. A match with the active mental representa-
tions at this level requires animated, quantitative, and graphical presenta-
tion of 'relational structures' (Craik, 1943).  
At the rule-based level, we are concerned with supporting memory for 
sign-rule correlations. It is important to take into account the fact that in-
frequent but risky conditions may require a certain rule configuration which 
may not be communicated by some sign configurations. This leads to errors 
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due to 'procedural traps' (Rasmussen, 1987). A proper match at this level in 
terms of information support will be against a kind of mental decision table. 
It will be important to support the evolution of cues which are not only con-
veniently perceptive, but also reliable across work situations. 
At the knowledge-based level, control of the course of reasoning will re-
quire presentation of symbolic information with reference to the mental 
model of the 'relational structures' of the work content, e.g., to maps of sys-
tem anatomy suited for causal reasoning. A fundamental problem is that the 
relational structure of a task content can be represented at several levels of 
the means-end dimension. Preparing suitable control strategies for unusual 
work situations is a design task, and depends on the ability to operate in a 
means-end/part-whole problem space. In complex systems, multiple display 
representations may be needed to represent the problem at each of the vari-
ous levels of abstraction. 
5.5. Monitoring of Performance 
For effective error recovery, it is important that performance monitoring be 
performed without undue delay. The problem is that, typically, work perfor-
mance depends on a long sequence of actions. Thus, monitoring of perfor-
mance with reference to the ultimate goal will be inefficient because the 
feedback will probably be received so late that the process has reached an 
irreversible state. Consequently, monitoring must depend on some kind of 
evaluation of the process of attaining the desired goal. The reference for 
judgement will depend on the circumstances. For instance, during skill- and 
rule-based control of familiar tasks, acceptable performance can be judged 
with reference to the usual, normal response of the environment, i.e., on 
monitoring normal information feedback patterns. This means, that infor-
mation defining normal responses to interaction should be coded into inte-
grated perceptive patterns that are easily recognized, that are easy to detect 
changes in, and above all, that effectively discriminate between different 
work conditions. 
During less familiar rule-based activities when perceptive references in 
terms of normal patterns are not available, monitoring depends on concur-
rent knowledge-based analysis of the response during the task sequence. 
Thus, the operator must 'understand' the responses of the task environment 
by referring to his mental model of the process. Typically, knowledge-based 
behavior involves planning and control of a sequence of actions to reach a 
chosen goal or product. As mentioned above, these activities will require 
mental models quite different from those necessary for control of the proper 
course of actions during the process. 
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5.6. Summary 
Let us summarize the argument developed in this section. First, we have ar-
gued that performance of real world tasks requires a complex interaction be-
tween the different levels of cognitive control. We also found that the inter-
face alone does not determine which level of cognitive control will be trig-
gered. The experience of the person and the demands of the task are also 
contributing factors. Together these two points indicate that all three levels 
of cognitive control will be invoked during task performance. In addition, we 
have demonstrated that each level requires a different type of information 
support, and that KBB, because it is so effortful, requires appropriate sup-
port if it is to be carried out effectively. The primary conclusion that emerges 
from this discussion is that an interface should support all three levels of 
cognitive control. 
Based on the theoretical development conducted to this point, we can 
formulate a specific goal for interface design:  
An interface should not force cognitive control to a level higher than the 
demands of the task require, but at the same time, it should provide the ap-
propriate support for all three levels of cognitive control.  
The obvious question, which will be addressed in the following section, is: 
How does one go about designing an interface that will accomplish these 
goals? 
6. A TAXONOMY OF HUMAN-SYSTEM INTERACTION MODES 
In this section, we present a morphological analysis (cf. Zwicky, 1967) of the 
transformations necessary for matching the interface representations to the 
requirements of each of the three levels of cognitive control. 
In our taxonomy, we distinguish between four different types of communi-
cation: direct, signal mapping, sign transformation, and symbolic transfor-
mation. Each of these can be used to describe the transformations in the 
sensory path (perception) or in the motor path (action). A factorial combina-
tion of all possible cases results in sixteen categories of human-system in-
teraction, as shown in Table 1. The modes with symbolic action transfor-
mations are segmented from the rest of the table because, with present 
technology, it is impossible to control a system via symbolic acts. Only for 
intelligent systems, which understand the meaning of messages (i.e., that 
perform under the control of conceptual models and goals, rather than 
rules), can input acts be interpreted as symbols. Compare this with Searle's 
(1981) discussion on whether computer programs are able to understand 
language.  
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 Transformation Across Manipulation Interface 
Transforma-
tion across 
observation 
interface 
 2. Monatomic trans-
formation of time-
space properties of 
movements (sig-
nals). 
 
3. Recoding of mes-
sages and move-
ments into com-
mand (signs) modi-
fying system func-
tions. 
4. Transmission of 
symbols 
to be interpreted by 
intelligent agent 
with 
goals and 'mental' 
model 
1. Direct observa-
tion 
1.1 Eating lunch; 
sculpturing; mowing 
objects; walking 
around. 
 
1.2 Car driving; 
operating a bulldoz-
er with analog joy-
stick; 
 
1.3 playing musical 
instrument with 
keys; operating 
crane with control 
keys, operating TV-
set; 
1.4 
 
 
2. Data to be ma-
nipulated represent-
ed by analog  space 
time configuration 
2.1 eye surgery 
through microscope. 
2.2 Operation of 
tele-robot through 
joy-stick and closed 
circuit TV; Driving 
tank through infra-
red goggles.  
Controlling process 
by   direct manipu-
lation of graphic 
analog display 
2.3 Operating robot 
by command keys 
and TV. 
 
 
Controlling process 
from graphic analog 
display by com-
mand keys and 
switches. 
2.4  
 
This column is 
presently not rele-
vant unless a human 
agent is a part of the 
system and inter-
prets messages, i.e., 
transforms to col-
umn 1-3. 
3. Data coded in 
terms of signs with 
reference to coding 
convention 
3.1 Positioning ob-
ject according to 
gestures; blind-
folded walking from 
instructions. 
3.2 Blind landing of 
aircraft from traffic 
control instructions. 
 
3.3 Operating crane 
by control keys and 
signs (gestures). 
3.4 
 possible only when gestures and instructions are analog signals  
  Process operation 
by keys and indica-
tor lights; 
 
4. Data coded sym-
bolically with refer-
ence to conceptual 
model 
4.1                           4.2 
 
                 Not applicable 
4.3 Process opera-
tion, interpreting 
displays; operating 
switches and keys; 
4.4 
TABLE 1. A taxonomy of human-system interaction modes. 
In this section, we will describe a few of the categories in Table 1, and pro-
vide some examples. It is important to note that any given interface may 
support several interaction categories. However, as mentioned above, an in-
terface's effectiveness is determined by allowing the operator to exert lower 
levels of cognitive control during most of the time, and only require him to go 
to higher levels when the circumstances (i.e., the demands of the domain) 
warrant it. Thus, successive levels of interaction can be thought of as incre-
mental in the sense that they subsume the lower levels. Finally, it should 
also be noted that the lower levels of interaction are concerned only with 
surface control (i.e., with the physical form of the environment), while higher 
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forms of interaction are concerned with both surface and deep control (i.e., 
with the functions of the internal process being controlled as well). 
6.1. Direct Observation - Direct Control (1-1) 
This interaction mode relies on a closed time-space signal transmission path 
through the sensorimotor system. Behaviour deals with control of the form, 
location, and configuration of physical objects in the material environment. 
Typical examples are sculpturing clay by hand and eating one's lunch. 
Quantitative data on time-space features of the environment serve to align, 
update, and synchronize the internal world model. For instance, seeing that 
one's cup is filled to the brim will serve as a sign to change one's behavior 
(i.e., to switch from a 'normal drinking' internal model to a 'careful drinking' 
internal model). Also, features in the environment serve as signs, empirically 
correlated with the need for updating the internal model. Control is ex-
pressed at the level of intentions (e.g., be careful since the floor is wet), but 
the actual carrying out of the actions is subconscious and effortless. The 
definition of signs is performed through experience, and at this subcon-
scious level, will be purely inductively correlational and probably not acces-
sible to conscious report. 
 
Figure 7. Direct observation and direct control: 1-1. 
6.2. Direct Observation - Indirect Control (1-2, 1-3) 
In both of these categories, a tool is inserted between the operator and the 
work context. The difference between the two cases is in the type of trans-
formation that the tool provides. 
1-2. The prerequisite for this mode of interaction is that the transfor-
mation in the motor path must allow for the transmission of actions in 
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terms of time-space signals, thereby enabling subconscious (i.e., analogue) 
processing. Thus, the control structure from category 1-1 is unchanged be-
cause the time-space communication of quantitative signals through the tool 
is maintained. However, different kinds of transformations may be involved, 
such as the amplification of movements or of force applied, or a coordinate 
transformation (e.g., cartesian / polar). Examples of this mode of interaction 
are driving a car, or operating a bulldozer. In phenomenological terms, the 
tool is embodied as an extension of the motor system. Attention is not on the 
interface between the tool and the body, but rather, on the interface between 
the tool and the work context. 
 
Figure 8. Direct Observation and Indirect Control, 1-2. 
1-3. In this case, the tool does not accept commands in the form of time-
space signals, but rather in the form of signs. The transformation from 
movement of the tool to action on the environment is a matter of pure con-
vention. Examples are playing a musical instrument with keys, or operating 
a crane via a keyboard. With this category of interaction, the tool is no long-
er perceived as an extension of the body. Instead observation of the surface 
of the tool is also necessary because the operator must translate his inten-
tions into a form that is acceptable by the tool's command language. As a 
result, attention must be divided between activities dealing with the intend-
ed effects of an action on the environment, and those dealing with the ma-
nipulation of the tool itself. The high capacity sensorimotor function will on-
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ly serve the tool interface manipulation task (communicating commands, or 
signs, for change in system function). With highly experienced operators, 
however, subconscious processing may be possible if an intention can be 
carried out by an automated subroutine of control actions. If this is the 
case, then the translation task is no longer necessary, and behavior is simi-
lar to category 1-2. It should be noted that such skilled behavior can only be 
achieved with a great deal of practice, and even so, only for situations that 
are frequently encountered. 
 
Figure 9. Direct Observation and Indirect Control: 1-3. 
There are cases where it may be difficult to classify an interaction mode as 
either of type 1-2 or 1-3. In particular, transformations including either dif-
ferentiation or integration (i.e., changing the order of control) may be charac-
terized as a signal or a sign. For instance, if an on-off switch is used to con-
trol a movement by means of a motor, the switching movement may be de-
fined as a sign, but through the integrating function of the motor, the time-
space, quantitative loop may still be considered intact as long as there is a 
one-to-one mapping between movements and the effect on work content. An 
example of this situation would be control of a crane from a set of function 
keys.  
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6.3. Indirect Observation - Direct Control (2-1, 3-1) 
2-1. In this case, a transformation device transmitting time-space signals is 
inserted in the sensory path. The observed information is an analogue rep-
resentation of the environment in which acts are to be performed. Because 
the time-space loop is unbroken, the equipment is perceived to be an exten-
sion of the senses, thereby allowing subconscious processing to take place. 
As a result, attention is devoted to the actual state of the work context ra-
ther than on interpreting the displayed information. Examples of this inter-
action mode are eye surgery through a microscope, or walking at night with 
infra-red goggles on. The transformation in the sensory path need not be 
isomorphic; a homomorphic transformation will suffice as long as the critical 
time-space signals are communicated. An example would be the mirror 
symmetry between hand movements and visual experience when working 
with a microscope. Therefore, other transformations such as a change in 
frame of reference (e.g., cartesian, polar, etc.) may be included as long as ob-
jects, and time-space properties are consistently mapped. 
 
Figure 10. Indirect Observation and Direct Control: 2-1. 
3-1. If the analogue representation is not maintained, and the mapping of 
time-space data and objects is interrupted, sensorimotor performance is no 
longer possible. Instead, the person must rely on rules for interpreting the 
displayed information. Examples of this interaction mode include a pilot be-
ing guided down to land via radio instructions, or cooking from a cookbook 
for the first time. In this case, the communication channel is no longer em-
bodied as part of the senses. The high capacity perceptual functions can be 
used for perceiving the displayed information, but the operator must per-
form the translation task in order to determine what the arbitrary display 
conventions mean in terms of what is going on in the work context, or alter-
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natively, adopt a surface control strategy and rely only on signs to control 
the system. Again, with experience the effort associated with the translation 
task can be reduced, but only for frequently encountered situations. 
6.4. Indirect Observation - Indirect Control (4-3) 
Examples of this type of interaction include control of 'invisible' processes 
like chemical process plant control. In these situations, two levels of control 
are relevant: the actions on the control panels (surface control), and the con-
trol of the process itself (deep control). 
 
Figure 11. Indirect Observation and Direct Control: 3-1. 
Typically in present systems, the observation surface and the action surface 
are physically separate (e.g., meters and screens as displays, and keyboards 
and switches as controls). On the action side, motor control is only con-
cerned with operation of the keys and switches which send signs to the inte-
rior process by means of a one-way command language. On the observation 
side, displays present individual variables representing states of physical 
processes. Taken together, these characteristics of current systems force the 
operator to interpret the displayed information into meaningful higher-level 
concepts, and also to translate her intentions into action sequences that 
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conform to the computer's command syntax. In other words, she must per-
form the translation task unaided. 
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Figure 12. Indirect Observation and Indirect Control, 4-3. 
The important point to realize is that it is possible to design an interface in 
such a way that the translation task is performed by the designer and the 
computer, rather than by the operator. In order to design such an 'ecological 
interface', the observation and action surfaces must be merged so that the 
time-space loop is maintained, thereby enabling subconscious processing. In 
addition, it is also necessary to develop a consistent one-to-one mapping be-
tween the abstract properties of the internal process to be controlled and the 
cues provided by the manipulation/observation surface. The goal is to make 
the invisible, abstract properties of the process (those that should be taken 
into account for deep control of the process) visible to the operator. In semi-
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otic terms, this means that the cues provided by the interface have a con-
sistent mapping onto the process properties. In this way, the same concep-
tual model may act as a symbolic representation when considered in relation 
to the elements of the environment and the laws controlling their relation-
ships, and as a system of prescriptive signs when considered in relation to 
the rules for model transformation and data processing. 
7. ECOLOGICAL INTERFACE DESIGN 
In the previous section, we discussed the transformations necessary to 
match the interface representations to the different levels of cognitive con-
trol. Based on this analysis, we propose the following prescriptive design 
principles that constitute the EID framework: 
1. Synthesize the control and the observation surfaces so that interaction 
can take place via time-space signals. 
2. Have the computer perform the translation task by 
developing a consistent, one-to-one mapping between the invisible, ab-
stract properties of the process and the cues or signs provided by the inter-
face. 
3. Display the process' relational structures in the form of a functional hi-
erarchy to serve as an externalised mental model that will support 
knowledge-based processing. 
A major benefit of the EID approach which is not discussed in this paper 
is that, because it attempts to support all three levels of cognitive control, 
EID minimizes the likelihood of errors related to interference between inter-
nal control structures. This aspect of EID is described in more detail by 
Rasmussen and Vicente (1987). 
7.1. An Example 
In order to make these abstract principles more concrete, we will provide an 
example of an ecological interface. Figure 13 illustrates such an interface. A 
thermodynamic overview of a process system is presented in terms of a 
Pressure vs. Temperature graph, commonly known as a P-T diagram. The 
two dark lines plotted on the graph show the time history of the hot and cold 
legs of the process. The top end of the line represents the current state. The 
dotted lines indicate the critical limits for the variables. Thus, the operator's 
task is to keep the state of the two legs within the critical limits. 
Following the first principle of EID, the operator is able to act on the inter-
face itself. Thus, in order to change the state of one of the legs, the operator 
merely points to the end of the trend curve with a mouse and drags the cur-
sor in the direction that he wants the system to go in. Another interesting 
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feature of this interface is that the abstract properties describing the pro-
cess' behavior (i.e., the thermodynamic relationship between temperature 
and pressure) are mapped onto the interface's perceptual characteristics. 
This means that the operator can perform the control task without having to 
resort to higher levels of cognitive control. Thus, the goal of the operator can 
be reformulated simply as: keep the endpoints of the two dark lines within 
the boundary defined by the dotted lines. In this way, a complex thermody-
namic control task can be performed as a tracking task. The operator need 
not consider what the signs mean; the axes might just as well represent ap-
ples and oranges rather than pressure and temperature. On the other hand, 
if for some reason, cognitive control is forced to the knowledge-based level 
(e.g., if an abnormal situation is encountered, or if the operator is relatively 
inexperienced) then the very same interface can be interpreted as symbols 
for conscious reasoning. In this mode, the operator would consider the se-
mantic content of the interface, (i.e., the thermodynamic relationship be-
tween pressure and temperature) rather than rely merely on its perceptual 
characteristics. 
Several qualifications are in order. First, it should be noted that the figure 
is intended merely as an explanatory device and not as an actual design 
proposal. The interface has not been constructed nor evaluated. Secondly, 
the interface represents the process at a single level of abstraction. A com-
plete design would necessarily include other levels of process representation. 
To conclude, we see that the hypothetical interface shown in figure 13 
embodies all of the principles of EID. It is consistent with the goal of pre-
senting information in a way that allows people to take advantage of the effi-
ciency of lower levels of cognitive control, while at the same, attempting to 
provide the necessary support for higher levels as well. 
8. COGNITIVE CONTROL IN VARIOUS WORK DOMAINS 
In this section, we provide an analysis of the cognitive control mechanisms 
associated with three domains: process control, musical skill, and biblio-
graphic search. The purpose of these analyses is to show that the EID 
framework provides a fruitful perspective for analyzing work domains with 
an eye towards interface design. 
8.1. Process Control 
Figure 14 illustrates the mappings between the process, the interface, and 
the operator's mental model for a typical process system. The activities asso-
ciated with each of the three levels of cognitive control are described below. 
8.1.1. Skill-based level. Because the operator cannot directly observe or 
act on the process, the sensorimotor control patterns at the skill-based be-
 36 
havior level will only be concerned with the manipulation of items on the in-
terface surface. The use of a mouse or a trackerball is preferred to command 
languages for this task because it maintains the communication of spatial-
temporal aspects of the perception-action loop intact. To allow the develop-
ment of a high degree of manual skill, the interface must be designed in 
such a way that the aggregation of elementary movements into more com-
plex routines corresponds with a concurrent integration (i.e., chunking) of 
visual features into higher level cues for these routines. Thus, the display of 
information should be isomorphic to the part-whole structure of movements 
rather than being based on an abstract, combinatorial code like that of 
command languages.  
8.1.2. Rule-based level. The rule-based level governs the choice of control 
alternatives. The display provides the operator with signs that he uses as 
cues for the selection of an appropriate action. Typically, the action alterna-
tives consist of a set comprised of operating procedures and routine control 
strategies. As discussed before, the problem with conventional interfaces is 
that the cues they provide the operators with are not uniquely defining with 
respect to the current process state. The result is that the cues that opera-
tors rely on are optimized for frequently encountered situations, but they 
can lead to 'procedural traps' in novel situations. EID attempts to overcome 
this difficulty by developing a unique and consistent mapping between the 
symbols that govern the behavior of the process, and the signs, or cues, that 
the interface displays. This will reduce the frequency of errors due to proce-
dural traps because the cues for action, being based on abstract process 
properties, will be uniquely defining with respect to the underlying system 
state. 
8.1.3. Knowledge-based level. Knowledge-based behavior consists of ab-
stract reasoning based on a mental model of the process. EID supports this 
level of cognitive control through the mapping of signs onto symbols. This 
mapping turns out to be very complex because the symbolic reference can 
be to several different conceptual levels representing general functions, 
physical processes, or equipment anatomy, depending on the actual circum-
stances (Rasmussen and Goodstein, in press). This means that, in addition 
to serving as cues for action, the same display configuration can also be in-
terpreted in several ways as symbols for reasoning. Thus, if the display con-
figuration is interpreted symbolically, it presents the operator with a visible 
model of the process that can support thought experiments and other plan-
ning activities. In addition, it is suggested that such a mapping will also 
support functional understanding necessary for error recovery. If signs can 
also be interpreted as symbols, then this may force the user to consider in-
formative aspects when looking for action cues (Rasmussen and Vicente, 
1987).  
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Figure 13 is a display intended to support the operators' disturbance handling and specula-
tions about energy and mass conditions by including a considerable amount of information 
which has to do with the generic f unctioning of a power plant i.e. in this case, the thermo-
dynamics of the process.  It has the form of a P(ressure)-T(emperature) diagram indicating 
primary and secondary P-T trajectories vs. time. 
 
Display formats having these features can, in some cases, readily be de-
veloped from the 'externalised mental models' which are normally being used 
as a support of functional reasoning in the form of graphic representation of 
relational structures such as technical drawings, graphs, and diagrams. 
Semiotic analyses of the use of such professional representations in actual 
work (Cuny and Boyé, 1981) have shown that they are actually interpreted 
as prescriptive signs or descriptive symbols, depending on the requirements 
of the task. Such an interface based on the engineering representation of 
two-phase thermodynamic systems in terms of a Rankine cycle diagram has 
been proposed by Beltracchi (1987).  
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Figure 14. The figure illustrates the complex mapping between the different levels of repre-
sentation of the invisible process and the different levels of cognitive control of operator ac-
tion.  
8.2. Musical Skill 
It will be useful to analyse the perceptual and motor mappings in activities 
where high capacity manual skills are involved. Musical performance is such 
a direct manipulation activity, requiring a very high information processing 
capacity in a real-time, on-line mode of control. Another particular feature of 
this task is that the manipulation surface and the information surface are 
separate, as is typically the case in conventional human-machine interfaces. 
Musical performance is based on a repertoire of highly automated and co-
ordinated patterns of movements. The musical notation in a score is per-
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ceived in terms of signs referring to such complex patterns. In a text book 
for playing an instrument (e.g., a recorder), a table of fingering patterns are 
given for the individual notes. From such instructions, one can learn to play 
an instrument without any knowledge about the symbolic meaning of the 
notation. When high performance skill evolves with practice, increasingly 
complex patterns of notes are related to integrated patterns of movements 
resulting in a very high capacity and speed in performance. This re-coding 
requires a notation in which chunking of the individual signs occurs in a 
way which maps directly onto a concurrent chunking of the required move-
ments.  
The structure active for the aggregation in the sign domain should map 
onto the structure useful for chunking patterns of movements. Chunking of 
movements involves operation in a part-whole relationship and, consequent-
ly, this structure should be reflected in the notation. Organisation of move-
ments should be reflected directly in the spatial, graphic organisation of the 
musical representation. The important feature of the present musical nota-
tion system is that the perception of patterns of signs can be changed con-
currently with the evolution of higher level motor patterns. The mapping be-
tween perceptual and motor patterns is not a simple one-to-one mapping, 
but can be changed dynamically by higher level signs indicating key-
changes, rhythmic instructions, musical style indications, etc. Thus, the in-
ternal dynamic world model (i.e., the attunement of the organism) can be 
modulated at will by the performer. The direct analogical mapping from vis-
ual patterns to motor patterns is such that changes in the part-whole di-
mension in both domains can easily and dynamically be performed accord-
ing to level of practice, and to higher level performance indicators, e.g., in-
structions from the conductor. 
It is possible to design more informationally 'economic' notation systems 
which are not directly structured in a part-whole hierarchy, but according to 
a generic tree in combinatorial coding instead. In that case, the transfor-
mation to action patterns would require analytical, rather than perceptual, 
re-coding, which in turn would make it more difficult to adapt the coding ac-
cording to practice and style. Such a system has, in fact, been proposed by 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1742) in a presentation for the Academy of Scienc-
es in Paris. His system was based on a logical notation in terms of a number 
code. It was well accepted by the scientists of the Academy, and a committee 
was founded to review the system for recommendation. The arguments of 
this committee mostly considered whether the system was new and therefore 
useful. Apparently, numerical systems for musical notation were subject to 
discussion at that time. However, as soon as Rousseau presented his system 
to the composer Rameau, he was met with arguments that convinced him: 
"Your signs are excellent, with respect to representation of tone and interval 
---; but they are very poor because they require an activity of thought which 
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cannot keep pace with the performance. The location of the signs in our 
usual notation imprint on the eye without support of this kind. If two notes, 
one very high and another very low are connected with a sequence interme-
diate notes, I immediately by first glance perceive the gradual rise from one 
to another. By your system, however, I necessarily have to spell my way 
through from number to number, one glance will not do it." Rameau's argu-
ments fit very well the discussion presented above.  
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Figure 15. The figure illustrates the interaction between control of movements, control of 
actions, and planning of actions during musical performance. 
A point worthy of further attention is the 'direct manipulation' nature of 
musical performance, in spite of the fact that the visual presentation of the 
score and the manipulation surface are separated. The determining issue is 
probably related to the fact that the music attended to and the score per-
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ceived visually have the same part-whole structure and merge into one per-
ceived pattern which maps directly onto the patterns of movements - one 
'sees' the music in the score. This, in fact, implies that, for this particular 
domain, the attention and manipulation 'surfaces' merge at the level of the 
music. 
Another example similar to musical performance is the high performance 
skill developed by users of the Abacus of China and Japan. It is well known 
that for the elementary arithmetic operations, the speed and accuracy of 
skilled Abacusians are comparable to that of calculator users. The trick ap-
pears to be the same as in musical performance, namely that the numbers 
to introduce in a calculation are read in terms of actions on the abacus, 
while the arithmetic operations signs + or - act like the transposition signs 
in music to select the number-action mapping set needed in the particular 
operation. It is interesting to see that instruction books for abacus users 
stress the need to be consistent in the use of the proposed number-action 
mapping; even simpler actions are possible in some cases, in order to devel-
op a high capacity sensorimotor skill.  
8.3. Bibliographic Search 
Bibliographic search is characterized by a lack of coherent internal structure 
of the type possessed by physical systems. The items of the database are not 
interrelated by causal laws like the components of a process plant, nor is 
there a direct mapping between the action patterns required for interaction 
with the computer and the feedback from the system at the semantic infor-
mation level, as was the case in the musical example. In order to obtain 
such a mapping, special precautions should be taken to create an internal 
structure in the database which is homomorphic with the user's problem 
space. The system should possess an internal structure that will present a 
space in which the user can navigate easily by means of the search ques-
tions which naturally emerge from the current problem, in contrast to navi-
gation guided by knowledge about the computer system. Typically, the in-
ternal structure of a data base is chosen to make location and retrieval of 
information items unambiguous, effective, and fast, i.e., it is based on a 
formal generic hierarchy (cf. Smith and Smith, 1977). For effective access by 
a user, however, retrieval should be possible from several different points of 
view. In a means-end space for instance, items should be accessible by 
question of 'what' they are, as well as 'why' and 'how' they should be used. 
Sensorimotor control of movement patterns is concerned only with ma-
nipulation of items on the visible surface of a system. The advantage of the 
mouse interface for this task is that the communication of spatial-temporal 
aspects in the perception-action loop is intact. The commands sent to the 
computer are selected from a repertoire presented on the screen. They are 
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identified by means of their physical position, and pointed at with the mouse 
before the selection order is transmitted by a 'click' sign. This implies a di-
rect relationship between the movement pattern and the perceptual control, 
as was the case in musical performance. Consequently, very efficient naviga-
tion in a database would be possible if the abstract attributes of the data-
base items could be consistently mapped onto positions in a spatial repre-
sentation. In this way, location in the database could be identified perceptu-
ally, while navigation in the space could be analogically controlled by pat-
terns of movements. This type of design has been systematically used in 
spatially structured databases on video disks, in which the exploration of 
the database is done in term of 'wandering around' via a joystick. 
For support of knowledge-based reasoning, however, there are several 
problems. First, the number of abstract search dimensions, as defined by 
the dimensions of the relational structure of the user's mental model, is 
quite high. Secondly, the number of items in the database is large. Finally, 
the attributes for search are not immediately and explicitly known by the 
users who, therefore, may want to 'browse'. One way to exploit the capabili-
ties of computers for flexible information presentation would be to relate the 
information items to the location in a virtual space, a store house, in which 
three dimensions of the multidimensional attribute space are represented by 
the location in a room, while the remaining relevant dimensions are taken 
care of by arranging for several rooms and departments in the store. Com-
puters systems have the advantage that the same item can be found in sev-
eral locations according to different search attributes. Thus, the stock can 
be browsed according to location when the rooms representing the most rel-
evant dimensions are visited. In this way, it will be possible to take ad-
vantage of the mnemonic power of the Method of Loci (cf. Fuller, 1898) by 
applying it to a multi-dimensional representation. In other words, to use the 
idea of George Miller (1968): Information is a question of 'where'. Visual 
presentation of the space and analogical control of movements (mouse or 
joystick) will result in skill-based control of the search itself. In this way, a 
direct relation between movements and the location in the information space 
is preserved.  
The structure of commands and the organisation of information presenta-
tion could be suggested from analogy to musical performance. A basic hy-
pothesis to suggest, based on the musical analogy, is that novices are focus-
ing on the manipulation surface, the 'tool handle', while skilled performers 
are focusing on the performance content. To enable an easy shift in the de-
gree of chunking of action elements and perceptual elements as a function of 
the general level of training and the current task demands, the structure of 
the perceptual and the motor representations should map one-to-one along 
the part-whole dimension. In this way, the search is formulated as an explo-
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ration of a multi-dimensional space, the representation of which depends on 
the strategy selected by the user. 
Analy sis of Needs and of Proposed Solutions; 
Select ion of Goals; Match of Proposals to Needs
Action Planning
Actual State 
of Affairs
Goals  to Meet, 
Product to Seek
Analy sis of Messages Planning of Search
Perceptual  
   Feature 
Formation
Prototypical 
Search Sequence
Signs
 Cues
Action Control
Movement Control
Navigation in Visual Field 
and M anipulation of Surface 
Features  Feat ure 
Formation
        Action Surface 
Moving Cursor in Landscape of 
Icons  with Mouse & Key s
Information Surface  
     Display Formats
Information Data 
Commands, 
Data
Intentions      for  Action
Signs
Reading Symbolic 
Information
Search    Strategy
Signals:   Mouse Movements 
Signs :      Icons, Select and Click
Signals:      Positions  
of Cursor   and Icons
Search in N-Dimensional Representation of 
Book Content by Different Strategies
 
Phys ical Books  arranged on Shelves
Indexing Locat ing
Work Domain
 
Figure 16. The figure illustrates the interaction between control of movements, control of 
actions, and planning of actions during bibliographic search. 
An important aspect to consider is that the search will be guided by the 
intuition offered by the user's 'world model', even for knowledge-based con-
trol of search. One may want to consult familiar regions, to browse, or a 
more rational, analytical approach may be chosen. An analytical approach is 
a kind of selective 'addressed' search in a domain selected from a display of 
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a 'work-rooms' showing the landscape of topical items which can be select-
ed. In the analogy of a city map, one has an indication of the street one 
wants to visit, together with a helicopter which will bring one there directly. 
Being there, one will look at the houses. In the 'browsing strategy', the user 
doesn't know the address, but will recognise what he is looking for when he 
sees it. This means that he has to pass through the streets of the city until 
he recognises an item. In a library, this implies scanning the physical books 
on the shelf. In a computerised system, however, the user can choose a sub-
space of, or a 'channel' through the multi-dimensional space, by specifying 
some aspects of the target which are known (those that are to be selected or 
avoided). Thus, the difference between analytical search and browsing in a 
computerised system is a question of degree, not of categories. 
In conclusion, for design of bibliographic search systems, it is necessary 
that the database reflect the user's needs in terms of search attributes. If 
this is not the case, a user will simply not be able to match the characteris-
tics of unfamiliar items with his own personal needs. This implies that the 
problem is not just one of designing interfaces to databases. In addition, the 
primary information indexing must be based on intimate knowledge of the 
users' point of view of the actual situation.  
9. AN OVERVIEW OF EID 
Let us summarize the development of our ideas up to this point.  We began 
by describing two accounts of DMI and by pointing out their limitations with 
respect to complex systems.  In an attempt to develop a theoretical frame-
work for interface design that would overcome some of these limitations, we 
described a model of HIP and extracted some implications for interface de-
sign.  We then extended and refined these implications into a specific goal 
for interface design, couched within the concepts of the SRK framework.  A 
morphological analysis of the transformations necessary to match the inter-
face representation to the different levels of cognitive control enabled us to 
develop a set of prescriptive design principles that constitute the EID frame-
work.  In this section, we will provide a general and informal description of 
what EID attempts to do, as well as pointing out some of its limitations. 
9.1. What It Attempts to Do 
An interface is a media for communication between operator and computer.  
In order for communication between agents to be effective, the agents must 
possess a shared representation of their domain of discourse (cf.  Brehmer, 
1986; Cussins, 1987; Roth, Woods, Elm, and Gallagher, 1987; Vicente, 
1988).  Within this perspective, the goal of EID is to produce a shared per-
ceptual representation of the problem solving world that will facilitate effec-
tive communication between man and machine.  This goal can only be 
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achieved if the representation is both normative and psychologically valid, 
i.e. , it must describe proper system functioning in a way that is compatible 
with the properties of human cognition.  With its ecological roots, EID rec-
ognizes the importance of this duality between environment (task) and or-
ganism (operator). 
While the communication aspect is without a doubt important, there is 
another primary facet of EID which we have yet to discuss.  Fundamental to 
the EID approach to interface design is the notion that the problem solving 
world is bounded and described by a set of invariants.  In other words, the 
task domain is a closed world consisting of relationships, or constraints, 
which always hold.  The problem solving world is bounded because the pur-
poses of the system are fixed, as are the means available for achieving those 
purposes.  The system can be described by invariants because its behavior 
follows certain physical laws (e.g., conservation of mass and energy). 
EID attempts to take advantage of these two factors by exploiting the task 
constraints so that the human operator needs less knowledge to effectively 
control the system.  More specifically, by mapping symbols onto signs, EID 
is embedding the semantics of the task in the perceptual characteristics of 
the interface.  This means that, in the limit, the operator could perform the 
task by acting as a symbol manipulator.  Instead of relying on symbolic rea-
soning, he could control the system via the perceptual characteristics of the 
interface alone.  Embodying the domain semantics in the interface would al-
low an operator that did not possess the theoretical knowledge of how the 
process functioned to exhibit the skilled level of performance that would only 
be expected of someone controlling the system from the fundamental princi-
ples that govern its behavior (cf.  Cuny and Boye, 1981; Roth et al., 1987).  
Or to put it more succinctly, EID allows operators to simulate deep control 
by relying on surface control. 
An example will help to make these points clear.  The following passage 
was originally intended to describe the Situated approach to language being 
developed at Stanford (cf.  Barwise and Perry, 1983).  However, because of 
the conceptual parallels between situation semantics and EID, it will serve 
our purposes equally well. 
"According to the Situated theory of the user interface for video cassette re-
corders, the user need only represent to himself the sequence of button press-
es in order to successfully operate the VCR.  He need know nothing about 
what effects those button presses are causing in the innards of the machine, 
because the task domain for Sony VCR operations is reasonably closed and 
tightly structured .... The point is 
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that the Situated VCR user is a formal symbol-manipulator and not an intelligent agent who 
operates the VCR on the basis of his understanding of how VCRs work.  Notice also that this 
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symbol manipulation ability does not generalize .... What works for a Sony doesn't work for a 
Philips" (Cussins, 1987, p. 16). 
Several caveats are in order.  First, some readers will no doubt object that 
providing the operator with the role of a mere ,symbol-manipulator' is not 
very satisfying.  To this argument, we have two replies.  First, the idea of the 
operator meeting the entire range of task demands by acting as a symbol-
manipulator (i.e., by relying merely on RBB and SBB) is an unattainable 
ideal.  There will always be circumstances where the operator will resort to 
KBB.  Our point, however, is that interfaces should be designed to support 
symbol-manipulating behavior so that the operator can effectively rely on it 
when he wishes.  As we mentioned previously, this is an adaptive strategy 
since lower levels of cognitive control are generally less effortful than higher 
levels.  Secondly, while the symbol-manipulating role may sound demean-
ing, the fact of the matter is that that is precisely what operators are already 
doing with existing systems.  As discussed earlier, operators have shown a 
consistent and overwhelming preference for lower levels of cognitive control. 
A second possible objection to the EID approach is: What happens when 
there is a failure?  It could be argued that everything is fine under normal 
circumstances but when something unexpected happens the same proce-
dures no longer work.  The VCR example is somewhat misleading in this re-
spect since there is not a 1:1 mapping between signs and symbols, i.e., the 
surface features do not map uniquely onto the fundamental semantic prop-
erties.  Thus, if there were a breakdown, the Situated VCR operator would be 
helpless.  However, in the case of an EID interface which is based on invari-
ants, the operator can also cope with faults.  The main reason behind this is 
that the invariants always hold.  Even when a valve is blocked, the laws of 
conservation of mass and energy still describe the behavior of the system.  
This means that faults can be detected as deviations from proper system 
functioning (Rasmussen and Lind, 1981), thereby allowing the operator to 
recover effectively from unexpected incidents. 
9.2. What It Doesn't Do 
In order to fully understand EID, it is important that we discuss the scope 
of the approach as well as some of its apparent limitations.  In terms of ap-
plicability, the EID approach to interface design can only be applied to prob-
lem solving domains that are closed and that have well-defined functions 
and processes.  The reason for this is that an EID interface has built-in 
transformations that make these functions and processes visible to the user.  
In cases where the functions relevant to the user do not constitute a stable, 
well defined set, it will not be possible for the designer to specify a normative 
representation that will be appropriate for the entire range of task demands 
that the operator will encounter.  In most cases, this limitation does not pre-
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sent a problem since high technology installations are designed with very 
specific purposes in mind. 
Secondly, because EID attempts to take advantage of the constraints spe-
cific to the problem domain, the competencies that operators acquire with a 
certain system will not transfer to other kinds of systems.  Again, this is not 
very problematic since, in the majority of cases where information technolo-
gy is applied to the work domain, each agent operates wihin the same work 
context day after day.  For instance, in the case of process control, the oper-
ator always controls the same process.  In addition, the advantage of infor-
mation technology is its flexibility that allow interfaces to be tailored to the 
individual work domains. 
It follows that EID requires that the designer have a good understanding 
of the problem domain.  In particular, the designer must know what the in-
variant relationships that describe the behavior of the system are.  In de-
signing interfaces for systems which require diagnosis and disturbance con-
trol, the designer must carefully analyse the various categories of faults in a 
manner similar to that usually followed for risk and safety analysis.  As 
mentioned above, EID tries to take advantage of the constraints inherent in 
the domain.  Thus, it is imperative that the designer know exactly what 
these constraints are if he is to embed them in the interface.  Due to rapid 
advances in the modelling of physical systems, there are many high technol-
ogy systems which EID can be applied to.  Nevertheless, it is important to 
point out that there are facilities being constructed whose behavior is not 
well understood by their designers.  In these situations, the application of 
EID is problematic at best. 
The limitations discussed to this point have to do with the applicability of 
the EID framework.  We hope to have shown that the EID framework has the 
potential to be successfully applied to a wide variety of systems.  The only 
factor limiting the generalizability of the approach is the designer's 
knowledge or understanding of the system being controlled. 
To summarize, EID attempts to reveal the complexity of a work domain to 
the operator in a f orm that he can cope with.  As Newman (cited in Rasmus-
sen, 1974, p. 27) states: "People don't mind dealing with complexity if they 
have some way of controlling it--- (If) a person is allowed to structure a com-
plex situation according to his perceptual and conceptual needs, sheer com-
plexity is no bar to effective performance".  This is critical to the understand-
ing of EID.  The approach does not relieve the operator of the task demands 
as an automated control algorithm would.  The line of attack is a different 
one.  Given a fixed set of task demands, EID attempts to answer the ques-
tion: What is the best way of presenting the complexity inherent in the do-
main?  This question looks at the problem from the side of the task.  The 
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dual question, arising from the side of the operator is: What is the most ef-
fective resource the operator has to deal with complexity? 
10. WHAT'S IN A NAME? 
The name ecological interface design alludes to a philosophy that is a very 
important part of our framework. We are referring to the ecological approach 
to psychology first advocated by Brunswik, and later, albeit in a different 
form, by Gibson (cf. Brunswik, 1957 and Gibson, 1966; 1979). In this sec-
tion, we will try to relate EID to each of these approaches. 
10.1. Probabilistic Functionalism 
The basic premise of Brunswik's theory of probabilistic functionalism is that 
psychology should be concerned, not just with the organism, but more im-
portantly, with the interrelationships between the organism and its envi-
ronment (Brunswik, 1957). Thus, Brunswik distinguished between two types 
of stimulation: distal variables represent objective descriptions of the state of 
the organism's ecology, whereas proximal variables represent the sensory 
input that the organism receives from its ecology. Brunswik believed that the 
organism is not able to perceive the distal variables directly, but instead 
must infer what is going on in the ecology from the imperfect (i.e., probabil-
istic) cues provided by the proximal variables. This leads to another im-
portant distinction, that between a cue's validity and its utilization. Cue va-
lidity is given by the correlation between the proximal and the distal varia-
bles. However, utilization of the sensory input, may or may not be appropri-
ate. Therefore, the concept of cue utilization is needed to describe how the 
organism makes use of the cues available to her. 
Given this framework, it follows that an appropriate goal for interface de-
sign would be to provide the operator with cues that have perfect ecological 
validity. In fact, this is the goal behind EID: by mapping symbols onto sig-
nals, we are in fact mapping distal variables onto proximal variables. Ideally, 
this would lead to a completely transparent system; the interface should 
completely and unambiguously define the current system state. Note that 
this does not necessarily guarantee that the organism's utilization of the 
cues will be optimal. 
10.2. Direct Perception 
Gibson's approach differed from Brunswik's in that he believed that percep-
tion was direct, i.e., that people directly perceived the higher order variables 
that the ecology had to offer them, without any mediating information pro-
cessing. These higher order variables are combinations of the simple varia-
bles that Brunswik dealt with, and according to the theory of direct percep-
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tion, they completely specify the distal objects, thereby eliminating the need 
for inference and probabilism (Brehmer, 1984). 
Gibson (1979) introduced a new vocabulary to explain his theory of direct 
perception. The basis for perception is said to be the invariant relationships 
in the ecology that are made available to the observer via invariants in the 
optical array. The notion of an affordance, an invariant combination of vari-
ables that demands or invites appropriate behaviors, was introduced to ac-
count for goal-oriented behavior. Basically, an affordance represents attrib-
utes of the environment that are relevant to the organism's purposes; it 
specifies a possibility for action. An object's affordances are perceived via the 
invariants in the optical array through a process of direct attunement which 
is closely related to the conditioning of the neural system as represented by 
the internal dynamic world model underlying skill-based performance (Ras-
mussen, 1986, p. 79). Thus, perception is viewed as a means of selecting the 
appropriate action to attain a goal, and the concept of an affordance relates 
perception to action. The result is goal-oriented behavior. 
In our case, the ecology is the process being controlled, and its invariants 
are described by a set of mathematical equations. Because the process is in-
visible, the information intrinsic in these invariants is normally not available 
to the operator. EID attempts to map the invariants in the process onto in-
variants in the interface. Again, the idea is to make visible the invisible. Ac-
cording to Gibsonian theory, these invariants in the interface should allow 
operators to directly perceive the system's affordances. Thus, EID can be 
viewed as building into the interface the affordances that the operator needs 
to effectively control the system. Because the system is best described in 
terms of an abstraction hierarchy (Rasmussen, 1986), the process will actu-
ally be described in terms of a hierarchy of higher-order invariants at vari-
ous levels of abstraction. 
This description of EID within the framework of direct perception implies 
that the system could be controlled without any mediating decision making; 
the information in the invariants would be perceived as affordances that 
would specify what action to take. This is only true if we are rigorous in our 
extension of Gibson's concept of affordance to the domain of complex sys-
tems. While in certain cases, it is possible to design an interface that will of-
fer an affordance in the classical sense of a possibility for action, we will ar-
gue that there will be other cases where this will not be possible. 
Using Rasmussen's (1974; 1986) decision ladder as a framework, we see 
that there are three general states of knowledge that an interface can pro-
vide an operator with. These are: 
1. Current system state; 
2. Target state to be achieved; 
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3. Action to carry out. 
Each successive category requires more information in order to remove 
the degrees of freedom that the operator is left with. The third category is the 
case of direct perception. But one of the fundamental assumptions of the 
theory of direct perception is that there is usually enough information avail-
able in the optical array to make the basic affordances of the terrestrial envi-
ronment directly perceivable (Gibson, 1977). If this assumption does not 
hold, direct, veridical perception is impossible. We believe that, in fact, this 
assumption does not always hold in process systems. The natural environ-
ment is more rich in information than an industrial process. 
The complexitity of process sytems means that sometimes, it is only pos-
sible to provide information at the first or second level. In these cases, the 
operator is required to reason in order to deal with the degrees of freedom he 
has available to him. For instance, because of the many-to-many mapping 
between levels in the abstraction hierarchy, there are various ways to attain 
a given target state. This creates a need for planning since the appropriate 
path to take cannot be determined from the available information. In addi-
tion, the fact that each fault is unique means that, even if the current sys-
tem state is completely specified, the target state to be achieved is not obvi-
ous. Again there are degrees of freedom, this time in determining, for in-
stance, whether it is better to keep the system on-line and try to compensate 
for the fault, or whether to suspend production. Thus, there is a need to 
evaluate conflicting criteria before deciding what the goal state should be. It 
should also be noted that, due to uncertainty in the data obtained from sen-
sors, it is even sometimes difficult to accurately determine what the current 
system state is. To summarize, depending upon the circumstances, control 
of the system will be more or less mediated by inferencing. 
Reinterpreting Gibson's theory in terms of the SRK framework will show 
how EID is related to direct perception. In the natural environment, there is 
enough intrinsic information in the optical array for interaction to take place 
at the skill-based level. This represents the case of affordances in terms of 
actions (category 3 above). However, the complex nature of process systems 
implies that the operator will have to resort to higher levels of cognitive con-
trol at certain times. This will occur when he is only afforded the target state 
to achieve (category 2 above), or the current system state (category 1 above). 
During these times, rule- or even knowledge-based behavior will be neces-
sary to successfully cope with task demands. In order to deal with these sit-
uations, EID attempts to make the most of the information that is available 
in order to afford the operator as much as possible. It is only because of the 
comparative complexity of process systems that control via direct perception 
is not possible as it is in the natural ecology. 
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11. DIRECT MANIPULATION REVISITED 
As mentioned at the outset, the goal of this paper was to develop a theoreti-
cal framework that overcame the limitations of current accounts of DMI. We 
are now in a position to summarize how far EID has come beyond DMI. 
First, our theoretical framework has allowed us to decribe the benefits of 
DMI in terms of properties of the HIP system. This description is both more 
rigorous and more general than Shneiderman's SSM and the theory provided 
by Hutchins et al. Secondly, as the name suggests, most discussions of DMI 
have been centered around the skill- and rule-based levels. The focus has 
been on displaying the domain objects of interest and allowing the user to 
act directly on those objects. However, displaying semantically rich objects is 
much more difficult to do in process control because there is a very complex 
mapping between the various levels in the abstraction hierarchy (Rasmussen 
and Vicente, 1987). In addition, the domains that DMI have been applied to 
(e. g., text editing and spreadsheet calculations) are simple enough that the 
user can infer what the underlying relational structures are without having 
them explicitly represented. We have argued that this is not the case in pro-
cess control, where functional reasoning takes place in a complex, causal 
network. Therefore, in order to deal with the complexities of process control, 
an interface must provide support for all three levels of cognitive control. 
EID provides some principles on how this should be done.  
12. CONCLUSION 
It is fitting that we end a paper of a theoretical nature on a philosophical 
note. In their discussion on DMI, Hutchins et al. (1986, pp.119-120) make 
the following comment. 
"On the surface, the fundamental idea of Direct Manipulation interface to task flies 
in the face of two thousand years of development of abstract formalisms as a means of 
understanding and controlling the world. So, the exterior of Direct Manipulation, 
providing as it does for the direct control of a specific task world, seems somehow ata-
vistic, a return to concrete thinking. On the inside, of course, the implementation of 
direct manipulation systems is yet another step in that long formal tradition. The illu-
sion of the absolutely concrete world is made possible by the technology of abstrac-
tion". 
We agree with Hutchins et al. that DMI are contrary to the tradition of for-
mal thinking. Given our ecological perspective, we would even go so far as to 
say that that is the whole point: people excel at utilizing the effortless, paral-
lel, routines available to subconscious processing, not at abstract, formal 
reasoning. EID recognizes this fact and provides guidelines for how to sup-
port people in what they do best. Knowledge-based processing should only 
be activated when the demands of the domain require it. Yet even then, EID 
recognizes that abstract reasoning is an effortful and error prone process, 
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and thus, it attempts to provide the support necessary to carry out such ac-
tivities effectively. 
The fact that the illusion of a concrete world is only made possible 
through the application of computer technology is not what is important. 
What is important is that systems designed in the EID philosophy will allow 
people to take advantage of the perceptual-motor skills that have been per-
fected by millions of years of evolution, while at the same time, supporting 
the more recently evolved, limited-capacity reasoning activities . The end re-
sult should be the creation of interfaces that reveal the ecology of the prob-
lem solving domain in a manner that is consonant with the properties of the 
human organism. 
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